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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY BENE-
FITS-ADOPTION OF MEDICAL-VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES WITHIN
STATUTORY AUTHORITY. McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F. 2d 1138 (8th
Cir. 1982).
Loyce McCoy, Clifford Stack and James Desedare applied for
Social Security disability benefits.' In determining their eligibility
the Social Security Administration 2 found that although the claim-
ants were not currently working and suffered from severe impair-
ments that limited their ability to engage in basic work activities, the
impairments were not included in the Administration's Listing of
Impairments.' The claimants were also found unable to return to
their past work but their claims were denied because they fell within
certain vocational rules4 known as the vocational grid.
The vocational grid contains three tables setting out the voca-
tional rules for persons who retain the residual functional capacity
(RFC) to perform only sedentary work (Table 1), light work (Table
2) and medium work (Table 3).5 These tables are divided into rules
1. 42 U.S.C. § 423, Ch. 7, Subch. 11 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Persons under sixty-five
who are disabled within the meaning of the statute and who file an application are eligible
for monthly benefits.
2. Initial claims and the first appeal are decided by state agencies under contract to the
Social Security Administration. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 421(a) (1976 & Supp. V
1981). The second level of appeal is heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 42
U.S.C. § 42 1(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and is a claimant's first opportunity for face-to-face
contact with the decisionmaker. A third level of appeal is available before the Appeals
Council. All the decisions are made in the name of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. After failing to obtain a satisfactory decision from these appeals through the So-
cial Security Administration, a claimant may bring suit for judicial review in federal district
court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App. 1 (1982). These medical listings describe in detail
precise groups of clinical, laboratory and symptomatic findings for many disease processes.
If a claimant is not working, a finding that his signs, symptoms and laboratory findings meet
or equal a specific listing creates a presumption of disability.
4. 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App. 2 (1982). These rules postulate various combina-
tions of age, education and work experience and direct a decision of disabled or not disabled
for each possible combination. For example:
Rule Age Education Previous Work Experience Decision
202.11 Closely Limited Skilled or semi-skilled Not Disabled
approaching or less skills not transferable
advanced age
5. 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App. 2 (1982). Rule 204 is listed separately and applies to
those who can do either heavy or very heavy work.
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which create categories based on age, education and work experi-
ence. For each combination of residual functional capacity, age, ed-
ucation and work experience, the rules direct a decision of disabled
or not disabled. In this instance, the rules indicated that jobs were
available in the national economy within the claimants' capabilities
and therefore directed decisions of not disabled.
The claimants filed separate suits in district court to reverse the
denials of benefits. In each case the district court set aside the ad-
ministrative decisions on the ground that the vocational grid was an
inadequate substitute for the testimony of a vocational expert in de-
termining whether there were jobs which the claimant could per-
form.6 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, reversed and
remanded, upholding the use of the vocational grid but suggesting
that the Secretary might wish to develop a notice procedure advising
claimants of the contents and application of the challenged regula-
tions. McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1982).
Congress established the Social Security Act, a comprehensive
system of health and welfare programs, in 1935. 7 Under the pro-
gram, states were given grants for old age assistance, unemployment
compensation, aid to dependent children, maternal and child wel-
fare and aid to the blind. The only program directly administered
by the federal government concerned old age (retirement) and death
benefits.
There was a gap in this comprehensive plan because retirement
benefits were originally computed on the amount of earnings a
worker had. If the worker became disabled and could no longer
work, his earnings would drop to zero. Because a computation
based on lack of earnings tended to reduce or eliminate retirement
benefits, the Social Security Act was amended in 19548 to "freeze"
the earnings records of persons with extended total disability in or-
der to preserve their retirement benefits. The amendment defined
disability as the inability to engage in substantial work because of a
medical impairment which was expected to last indefinitely or to
result in death.9
A gap still remained because disabled workers had no income
from Social Security until retirement age. Thus, in 1956 the Social
6. Desedare v. Secretary of HEW, 534 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Ark. 1980). McCoy v.
Schweiker and Stack v. Schweiker were unreported.
7. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
8. Social Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-761, 68 Stat. 1052 (1954).
9. Id.
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Security Act was amended again to make cash benefits available for
the first time to disabled persons between the ages of fifty and sixty-
five.' O The definition of disability remained exactly the same.
The 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act I shortened
the requisite duration of those impairments which had lasted or
could be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months. The definition of disability was amended in 1967 to
amplify the meaning of "inabi'lity to engage in any substantial gain-
ful activity."' 12 Under this new definition Congress required that the
impairment be medically determinable and that it not only prevent
the claimant from returning to his past work but also prevent his
performance of any other work in the national economy for which
he was qualified by virtue of his age, education and work experience
regardless of availability of work or of employers' hiring practices. ,3
The statutory mandate thus makes entitlement to disability benefits,
dependent upon vocational as well as medical factors. This defini-
tion of disability has not been changed.
The resulting disability insurance program is one of the largest
and most complex entitlement programs in this country with ap-
proximately 96,800,000 workers insured in 1981.1' As of August
1982, there were about 2,657,000 disabled workers receiving bene-
fits. 15 In view of the sheer number of claims, countless variations in
types of impairments, and individual characteristics bearing on the
ability to work, a need developed for more consistent assessments of
eligibility.
Accordingly, the statutory guidelines have been supplemented
and interpreted in administrative rules and regulations which were
10. Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, 70 Stat. 807 (1956). The
Act was amended again in 1960 to drop the age 50 requirement for cash benefits. Social
Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924 (1960).
11. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965).
12. An individual ...shall be determined to be under a disability only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
area in which he lives, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. ...
[W]ork which exists in the national economy means work which exists in signifi-
cant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions
of the country.
Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821, 868 (1967).
13. Id.
14. 45 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, No. 81, at 5 (1982).
15. 45 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, No. 11, at 1 (1982).
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designed to carry out the statutory definition of disability, including
the crucial concept that a claimant may suffer from a severe medical
impairment and yet still be able to engage in some work activity.
The rules at issue in McCoy are the product of administrative pro-
ceedings which began with public hearings in 1976 and ended with
the promulgation of the rules in 1978.16 The grid codified prior
practices for the evaluation of age, education and past work
experience.
In promulgating the rules, the Social Security Administration's
intention was to clarify for the public how disability was determined
when these vocational factors were considered in view of the statu-
tory emphasis on inability to do any work. The rules were written
to assure sound determination of disability in those cases where vo-
cational factors were considered as well as to assure greater consis-
tency and to advise the public, the adjudicative personnel in the
Social Security Administration and the courts of the standards
used. 17
The rules take extensive administrative notice of the existence
of unskilled work at the sedentary, 8 light' 9 and medium2" exer-
tional levels, 2' of the effect of age22 on the ability to transfer to new
16. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,437 (1976). Issues addressed in the hearings included whether: the
Secretary had the authority to promulgate the rules; the rules represented a departure from
the individualized determination required by the Act as interpreted by the courts; the data
relied upon was accurate and a proper subject for administrative notice; the rules repre-
sented a rebuttable presumption or hard and fast categories; and the rules would result in
less use of vocational experts. 42 Fed. Reg. 8,223 and 8,224 (1977). In the course of the
meetings concerns were voiced over: the facts administratively noticed; that no other agen-
cies were contacted in drafting the rules; that there were no vocational experts on the staff
which drafted the rules; that the AL's were not consulted, and that there had been no long
and detailed study of the rules. Transcript, Vocational Factors Meeting, March 21, 1977,
Dallas, TX at 36, 44, 42.
17. 43 Fed. Reg. 9,284 and 9,285 (1978).
18. Sedentary work requires the ability to sit most of the day with occasional lifting and
carrying of small items and occasional walking and standing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)
(1982).
19. Light work requires the ability to stand and walk most of the day with an occasional
maximum lift of about 20 pounds and frequent lifts of 10 pounds, or sitting most of the day
and operating arm or leg controls. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
20. Medium work requires the ability to walk and stand most of the day with a maxi-
mum lift of about 50 pounds and a frequent lift of about 25 pounds. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1567(c). Heavy work requires the ability to lift a maximum of 100 pounds and a
frequent lift of about 50 pounds. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(d).
21. The rules take notice that there are about 200 separate sedentary, unskilled occupa-
tions, 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App. 2, § 201.00 (1982); 1600 sedentary and light unskilled
occupations, Id. at § 202.00; and 2500 sedentary, light and medium occupations. Id. at
§ 203.00.
22. Younger workers are those age 50 and under, subdivided into younger workers aged
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work, and consider the effects of education 23 and past work experi-
ence as well.24 In general, the greater the range of work a person
can do, the younger a person is, the more education a person has
and the more skilled work a person has done, the more likely it is
that the rules will direct a decision of not disabled.
The Supreme Court has resisted efforts to require more than
the bare minimum in rulemaking proceedings. 26 In promulgating a
rule, the agency must only give notice of what it is doing and give
the public an opportunity to comment, unless there are specific ad-
ditional provisions in the substantive statute conferring rulemaking
authority on the agency.27
In fashioning the rules that were under attack in McCoy, the
Secretary took administrative notice of the existence of jobs in the
national economy and the effect of age, education and past work on
the ability to transfer to new work. Administrative notice has been
described as using facts from sources outside the case under
consideration. 28
The Supreme Court has upheld agency use of administrative
notice since at least 1913 .29 The Court has allowed the use of data
not found in the formal record before administrative agencies in ac-
tions such as ratemaking procedures, 30 evaluation of applications
for operating permits 3' and formulation of labor remedies. 32 Some
45-49 and those under age 45. Relative youth is considered a vocational asset. Workers
approaching advanced age (50-54) are considered to have a moderately limiting factor,
while workers of advanced age (55 and over) are considered to have a severely restricting
factor. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 (1982).
23. The most adverse educational level is illiteracy. Still adverse, but less so, is a margi-
nal education (up to the 6th grade). A limited education (7th through 11 th grades) is consid-
ered consistent with the majority of unskilled work, while a high school education or more is
considered a vocational asset. 20 C.F.R. § 1564 (1982).
24. Absence of work experience is a vocational liability while work which includes
skills that can be used in jobs within the claimant's physical capacity is considered an asset.
20 C.F.R. § 1568 (1982).
25. In 1980 these regulations were amended to clarify language but no substantive
change in meaning was effected. 45 Fed. Reg. 55,584 (1980).
26. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978) (reversing a judicial grafting of requirements beyond that required by
the Administrative Procedure Act, infra note 29).
27. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
28. See generally I K Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 6:17 (2d ed. 1978).
29. ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913) (proceeding to set rates).
30. The ICC could draw inferences based on its experience as to the presence or ab-
sence of competition. Id. Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 560
(1945) (allowed administrative inference on the probable effect of rates on traffic when the
railway itself had submitted the evidence).
31. United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515 (1946) (it was not
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limits on administrative notice have been established. These limits
emphasize the need for administrative fairness, such as informing a
party that certain evidence will be considered as a matter of admin-
istrative notice.33
The Eighth Circuit, in evaluating agency regulations, has made
detailed inquiries into the evidence available to the agency. In
C.P.C. International, Inc. v. Train,34 companies which were engaged
in processing corn challenged EPA pollution regulations. The court
noted that its review was "limited to a determination of whether the
Administrator's decision was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.' -35 The court ana-
lyzed in detail the data upon which the EPA based its regulations
and concluded that they were inadequate to support the standards
promulgated. Yet, in Independent Meat Packers Association v.
Butz, 36 the Eighth Circuit deferred to the expertise of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture in revising grading standards. The full admin-
istrative record, with numerous studies and comments, was before
error for the ICC to look to the record of another applicant for operating permits when the
evidence applied to both and prejudice was not shown).
32. N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953) (approving the reinstate-
ment of employees discharged in a discriminatory manner, the Court said "[I]n devising a
remedy the Board is not confined to the record of a particular proceeding. 'Cumulative
experience' begets understanding and insight by which judgments not objectively demon-
strable are validated or qualified or invalidated." Id. at 349). The Court has also stressed
the limited court review of agency action which "calls for the application of technical knowl-
edge and experience not usually possessed by judges." Federal Power Comm'n v. Colorado
Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 501 (1955).
33. United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry., 265 U.S. 274 (1924), arose out of hearings
held to set rates. In the course of the hearings the hearing officer noted a need for the annual
reports of the affected carriers, but the reports were not formally introduced as evidence.
This was held improper administrative notice. "The general notice that the Commission
would rely upon the voluminous annual reports is tantamount to giving no notice whatso-
ever." id. at 290. The Court explained why such notice was improper. "The objection to
the use of the data contained in the annual reports is not lack of authenticity or untrustwor-
thiness. It is that the carriers were left without notice of the evidence with which they were,
in fact, confronted, as later disclosed by the finding made." Id. at 289. In Ohio Bell Tel. Co.
v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937), the Commissioner was required to deter-
mine the value of the phone company's property in order to revise rates. In doing so, it took
evidence on valuation for a certain date. However, it also considered price fluctuations on
the basis of administrative notice of trade journals. This was held improper. Cognizance of
general trends would be appropriate, but the precise extent of a decline, when that was the
point in controversy, would not. Without access to the facts noticed, the Court could not
decide if the Commissioner's findings were supported by evidence. Id. at 307.
34. 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
35. Id. at 1043-44 (quoting Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971)).
36. 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976).
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the court below.37
The Eighth Circuit has extensive experience in evaluating So-
cial Security disability claims and interpreting Social Security regu-
lations. The burden of proof initially is on the claimant to prove he
is disabled.38 However, once he demonstrates that he is incapable of
returning to his past employment, the burden of proof shifts to the
Secretary to show that the claimant can engage in other kinds of
work.3 9 In meeting this burden the Secretary must demonstrate what
kinds of work exist for a person with the claimant's capabilities.
The proof must involve more than demonstrating mere theoretical
ability to perform the work.4 °
Prior to McCoy this proof ordinarily took the form of testi-
mony of a vocational expert.41 Without the testimony of a voca-
tional expert there was insufficient evidence for an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) to find that there was substantial gainful employ-
ment available to claimants.42 Further, the testimony of the expert
had to be based on hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ which
precisely related the claimant's specific impairments to the voca-
tional opportunities available. Failure to do so rendered the voca-
tional expert's testimony fatally deficient.43 The rules attacked in
McCoy would appear largely to supplant the need for expert
testimony.
In McCoy v. Schweiker" the court first looked to the Social Se-
curity Act for the congressional definition of disability.45 The con-
gressional definition emphasized the claimant's inability to do any
form of substantial work and thus established a rigorous standard
for eligibility.
37. Cf. National Renderers Ass'n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1976) (rejecting EPA
standards on effluent discharges when the cost figures were stale).
38. Voyles v. Harris, 636 F.2d 228, 229 (8th Cir. 1980); Dressel v. Califano, 558 F.2d
504, 507 (8th Cir. 1977); Lund v. Weinberger, 520 F.2d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1975); Garrett v.
Richardson, 471 F.2d 598, 599 (8th Cir. 1972).
39. Garrett, 471 F.2d at 598.
40. Cole v. Harris, 641 F.2d 613, 614 (8th Cir. 1981); Thompson v. Mathews, 561 F.2d
1294, 1296 (8th Cir. 1977); Brinker v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 13, 18 (8th Cir. 1975); Cele-
brezze v. Bolas, 316 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1963).
41. Boyer v. Califano, 598 F.2d 1117, 1119 (8th Cir. 1979); Dressel, 558 F.2d at 507;
Garrett, 471 F.2d at 603.
42. Boyer, 598 F.2d at 1119.
43. Stephens v. Secretary of HEW, 603 F.2d 36, 41 (8th Cir. 1979); Daniels v. Mathews,
567 F.2d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 1977).
44. 683 F.2d 1138 (1982).
45. 1d. at 1142-43. The definition can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
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The court next looked to the grant of authority conferred upon
the Secretary to make regulations. 46 The court found that the con-
gressional grant of power was twofold.4 ' First, it granted power and
authority to establish rules, regulations and procedures. The grant
was more than the mere power to interpret the statute; it was power
vested in the Secretary to establish rules and regulations. This
power was limited only by the requirement that such rules and regu-
lations be consistent with the provisions of the Act.48 Second, the
language beginning "and shall adopt '4 9 was a congressional com-
mand. While the first part of the provision granted authority to
make rules and regulations, the second part made the exercise of
that power mandatory. This grant of power also described the kinds
of rulemaking required. "[Tihe description of the kinds of rulemak-
ing that are required is significant: the rules and regulations are
both 'to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of evidence'
and to cover 'the method of taking and furnishing the same.' "50
Thus, the congressional grant encompassed "both the quality ('na-
ture') and quantity ('extent') of evidence necessary to support a find-
ing of entitlement to disability benefits."'"
From this analysis the court found support to show that the
statutory grant of authority allowed the agency to use general rules,
in the form of the grid, to make conclusions regarding disability.
However, the court also expressed concern over the nature of the
vocational rules. "[A]ny table that purports mechanically to deter-
mine whether an individual, unique human being can do a certain
job must raise questions as to whether the fact-finding function is
being so far simplified as to become unrealistic."52
The court then turned to Supreme Court precedent. Batterton
v. Francis53 involved the challenge of a regulation which numeri-
46. 683 F.2d at 1143.
The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations
and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter,
which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions, and shall adopt
reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature
and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the
same in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976).
47. McCoy, 683 F.2d at 1143.
48. Id.
49. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976).
50. Id. [emphasis in original].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 432 U.S. 416 (1977). Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 274-5 (1982), and Schweiker v.
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cally defined unemployment. In upholding the regulation the
Supreme Court noted that when Congress expressly delegates the
power to prescribe standards to the Secretary, the primary responsi-
bility for interpreting the statutory terms rests with the Secretary
rather than with the courts. 54 From this Supreme Court decision the
Eighth Circuit concluded "that in the case of legislative, substantive
regulations promulgated with express congressional authority, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, not the courts, is the pri-
mary interpreter of the statute."' 5" The court acknowledged that
these regulations had been upheld by several other circuits.5 6
The court then considered the manner in which the regulations
were promulgated. 7 These rules were promulgated after notice and
comment procedures which were not challenged. The rulemaking
was based in part on the Secretary's experience in a large number of
disability cases and on the same documentary sources that voca-
tional experts use in testifying. "We doubt, as a practical matter,
that vocational experts, who necessarily vary widely in their knowl-
edge and experience, are a more reliable source in the general run of
cases than the materials on which the Secretary relied in the
rulemaking proceeding.""8
The court observed that the agency took official notice of the
fact that jobs exist in the national economy which people with cer-
tain characteristics can perform.
[A]s Congress in passing a law may find that certain facts exist,
so an agency in issuing a legislative or substantive regulation may
take certain facts as irrebuttably established, so long as this find-
ing is not arbitrary and capricious, is within the authority dele-
Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981), are cited to the same effect. McCoy, 683 F. 2d at
1144. Herweg and Gray Panthers both upheld a medicaid regulation which "deemed" in-
come of a noninstitutionalized spouse available to meet the needs of the institutionalized
spouse.
54. Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425-26.
55. McCoy, 683 F.2d at 1144.
56. Id. at 1144-45, citing Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1982); Cummins v.
Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1982); Torres v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 668
F.2d 67 (1st Cir. 1981); Kirk v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir.
1981); Gagnon v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 666 F.2d 662 (1st Cir. 1981); Thomas
v. Schweiker, 666 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1982); Geoffroy v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv.,
663 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981); Salinas v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1981); Perez v.
Schweiker, 653 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981); Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1981). The
Second Circuit partially invalidated the rules in Campbell v. Secretary of Dept. of Health &
Human Serv., 665 F.2d 48 (2nd Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nora. Hackler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct.
1952 (1983).
57. McCoy, 683 F.2d at 1145.
58. Id. at 1145-46.
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gated to the agency by statute, and is not in violation of the
Constitution. 59
The court stressed two points. First, each of the characteristics of
residual functional capacity, age, education and past work experi-
ence was still open to litigation. Second, the opportunity to rebut
the presumption of ability to perform certain work had already been
given in the rulemaking proceeding.60 The court then looked to the
vocational rules themselves to determine when they apply and how
they operate. According to the court, the rules are not to be used
unless a claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education and
work experience match a specific rule. 6 1 "If a claimant's relevant
characteristics differ in any material respect from those of the grid,
the Guidelines cannot be applied, and all the pre-existing require-
ments of case law, including the customary insistence on the use of
vocational experts, retain their full vigor. ' 62 Thus, the Eighth Cir-
cuit, while upholding the use of the grid, gave the regulation a nar-
row reading.
The underlying facts upon which the rules operate must be de-
termined before the rules can be applied and these facts are open to
proof.63 The grid establishes that jobs exist for people with specified
characteristics, but it does not relieve the Secretary of the burden of
showing that the claimant is a member of one of the groups de-
scribed in the regulation. Moreover, the grid does not apply when
the impairment is solely nonexertional, for example when it involves
only mental, sensory or skin impairments. 64 Further, if the impair-
ment consists of a combination of impairments resulting in both ex-
ertional and nonexertional restrictions, the rules do not apply. 65
Thus, as viewed by the Eighth Circuit en banc, the vocational rules
have self-limiting features. The rules do not relieve the Secretary of
the burden of proving that the claimant can do other work, and the
59. Id. at 1146.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(a) (1983) provides in part:
Where any one of the findings of fact does not coincide with the corresponding
criterion of a rule, the rule does not apply in that particular case and, accordingly,
does not direct a conclusion of disabled or not disabled. In any instance where a
rule does not apply, full consideration must be given to all of the relevant facts in
the case in accordance with the definitions and discussions of each factor in the
appropriate sections of the regulations.
64. Id. at § 200.00(e).
65. McCoy, 683 F.2d at 1148.
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adjudication of disability claims still requires a large measure of in-
dividualized handling.66
Because of the complexity of the vocational rules and the vari-
ous proofs necessary to use them, the court suggested that "[t]he So-
cial Security Administration may wish to develop a pre-hearing
notice so that a claimant can come to the hearing prepared to pres-
ent testimony and evidence relevant to the Guidelines. "67
An analysis of this area of social security law shows that the
vocational rules purport to take administrative notice of the exist-
ence of jobs in determining eligibility. Had the Social Security Ad-
ministration not thought that such rules would have had widespread
applicability, it is unlikely that it would have engaged in formal
rulemaking procedures lasting for years. In view of the large
number of potential claimants,68 adoption of the vocational rules
might have significantly changed the determination of eligibility.
Such changes would not only have had an effect on the agency in-
volved, but on the courts as well, since judicial review of Social Se-
curity disability decisions is an integral part of the program. The
impact of judicial review on the caseload of the courts is substantial.
In 1979 Social Security disability benefit cases were the most fre-
quent form of administrative agency appeal heard before the Eighth
Circuit.69
Decisions handed down subsequent to McCoy already suggest
that the Eighth Circuit takes a somewhat narrower view of the ap-
plicability of the vocational grid than do some other circuits.70
However, McCoy was cited by the Fifth Circuit for the proposition
that the use of the grid meets the Secretary's burden of proof with-
out qualification.7 ' Later, the Eighth Circuit noted, in Tucker v.
Schweiker 72 that use of the grid was inappropriate when there was a
mental impairment involved. The court again emphasized the nar-
66. See, e.g., Streissel v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 1231 (8th Cir. 1983); Hagan v. Schweiker,
717 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1983); Baugus v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 717 F.2d
443 (8th Cir. 1983); Haynes v. Heckler, 716 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1983); Hillhouse v. Heckler,
716 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1983); Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1983); Gates v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 712 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1983); Simonson v.
Schweiker, 699 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1983).
67. 683 F.2d at 1148.
68. Over a million disability decisions are made per year. 45 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLE-
TIN No. 8 at 7 (1982).
69. Brand v. Secretary of HEW, 623 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1980).
70. See supra cases cited in note 66.
71. Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 1144, 1155 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding a denial of
benefits based on the vocational grid).
72. 689 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1982).
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row circumstances in which the vocational grid applies in Powell v.
Schweiker73 when the criteria of a rule were not precisely met. A
district court has even held that pain is a nonexertional impairment
precluding use of the vocational grid.74
The limited circumstances in which the Eighth Circuit holds
the vocational grid applicable are apparently at odds with the broad
facial applicability of the regulations. At least one commentator
thought the vocational regulations were designed to limit areas in
which vocational experts could disagree about the availability of
jobs.15 The holding in McCoy essentially relegates use of the voca-
tional grid to those few instances when a rule is precisely met, and,
thus, the Eighth Circuit's prior emphasis on the use of vocational
experts and the requirements of realistic vocational opportunity re-
mains largely intact.
While upholding the vocational grid in form, the decision in
McCoy clearly indicates to those representing disability claimants in
the Eighth Circuit that the grid should pose little obstacle to ob-
taining benefits. The court's elaboration on nonexertional impair-
ments and ranges of residual functional capacity which fall between
the ranges specified in the rules suggests that there will be exceed-
ingly few cases to which the grid will be held to apply upon appeal.
However, McCoy also stands as a judicial validation of the ex-
ercise of administrative notice in rulemaking. There is a fundamen-
tal tension between administrative convenience on the one hand and
individual fairness on the other. The notice validated here suggests
that great deference will be accorded to the agency when it takes
administrative notice during rulemaking, even though the facts ad-
ministratively noticed later became part of an individual adjudica-
tion as a substitute for evidence.
The vocational grid was promulgated after notice and comment
procedures, but such procedures assume that the affected public will
be aware of them and will participate in the process. There also
appears to have been little study of the vocational rules. According
to the Director of the Division of Regulations of the Social Security
Administration, "We did not go into a long and detailed study of
the regulation because we [did not] believe they were going to make
73. 691 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1982).
74. Cornella v. Schweiker, 545 F. Supp. 918 (D.C. S.D. 1982). See supra cases cited in
note 66.
75. Goldhammer, The Effect of New Vocational Regulations on Social Security and Sup-
plemental Security Income Disability Claims, 32 AD. L. REV. 501, 505 (1980).
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any change in the process ... 76
The most significant facts administratively noticed by the regu-
lations are the presence of specific numbers of sedentary, light and
medium occupations in the national economy. Of the sources listed
in the regulation, only the Dictionary of Occupational Titles contains
this type of national information. 7  This work was published in
1965 by the Department of Labor and is now dated.78
The application of the vocational grid to disability claims is sig-
nificantly limited by McCoy. However, the validation of adminis-
trative notice of rather dated materials suggests an expansion of the
concept of administrative notice.
H Mayo Smith
76. Transcript, Vocational Factors Meeting, March 21, 1977, Dallas, TX at 42.
77. 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App. 2, 200.00 (1983).
78. The fourth edition of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles was partially published
in 1977, but the type of information relied upon for the regulations was not available in
formulating the rules. Some of the other reference materials used to support the age classifi-
cations go back as far as 1957. 43 Fed. Reg. 9,289 (1978). Some of the material used to
support the work experience classifications go back to 1956. Id.
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